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Résumé 
De nombreuses recherches ont souligné que les institutions du marché d’un pays constituent des 
déterminants importants de son taux de chômage. Cette étude généralise l’idée de Davis (1998) selon 
laquelle les instituions des partenaires commerciaux influencent aussi le taux de chômage d’un pays 
parce qu’elles sont à la source d’avantages comparatifs. L’investigation empirique confirme que les 
interactions entre le commerce bilatéral et les réglementations relatives du marché du travail affectent 
le taux de chômage d’équilibre. Compte tenu des limites relatives aux données dans ce domaine, 
l’ambition de ce papier est simplement d’attirer l’attention sur la pertinence de ces interactions comme 
facteurs complémentaires aux autres explications du chômage. Un autre résultat intéressant est qu’un 
pays relativement peu réglementé comme le Canada peut être affecté négativement parce que son 
principal partenaire est encore moins réglementé, alors qu’un pays hautement réglementé comme 
l’Allemagne est relativement protégé car ses partenaires le sont tout autant. 
 
Mots clés: Chômage, Commerce international, Institutions du marché du travail 
   
Abstract 
 
There is ample evidence that a country’s labour market institutions are important determinants of 
unemployment. This study generalises Davis’ (1998) idea according to which the institutions of the 
trade partners matter also for a country’s equilibrium unemployment rate as they generate 
comparative advantages. Moreover, the empirical investigation provides some evidence that the 
interactions between bilateral trade and relative labour market regulations affect the equilibrium 
unemployment rate. Given data limitations in this area, the ambition of this paper is merely to draw the 
attention to the general relevance of these interactions as complementing factors to other explanations 
of unemployment. Another interesting finding is that a fairly low regulated country like Canada can be 
negatively affected because its main trading partner is even less regulated, while a high regulated 
country like Germany appears rather sheltered because its trading partners are also highly regulated.        
 
Keywords:  Unemployment, Trade, Labour Market Institutions 
JEL Classification: F16, J50, F10, F41  
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“A more subtle – but by this more important – reason for considering a global 
approach is that the consequences even of purely local institutions and 
shocks often depend crucially on the links to the global market” 
Donald Davis  
 
 
1. Introduction 
The impact of labour market institutions on unemployment is generally assessed in empirical studies 
without taking into account the consequences of the increasing integration between countries. This is 
surprising given the prominent attention placed on the employment consequences of globalisation in 
the public and political debate. Theoretically, Brecher (1974) shows how labour market rigidities 
generated by a binding minimum wage are magnified by international trade, and Davis (1998) builds 
on Brecher’s idea and draws attention to the key interactions between labour market institutions 
designed at the country level and global goods markets.1 In a stylized trade model between flexible 
wage “America” and minimum wage “Europe”, Davis shows that trade ties up factor prices between 
countries and leads to an increase in unemployment in “Europe”. Davis’ main intuition lies in the fact 
that “even when factor markets are strictly national, with idiosyncratic institutional features, they cannot 
be considered in isolation when goods markets are global”.  
 
The current paper takes this assertion seriously and brings two main contributions. Firstly, it extends 
Davis’ framework using Pissarides (2000) matching model. This theoretical exercise shows the extent 
to which Davis’ main idea could be generalised to a broader type of labour market institutions than the 
simple minimum wage context. The main mechanism through which institutions of trading partners 
could influence unemployment is straightforward. To the extent that labour market institutions matter 
for unemployment, they affect the cost of labour and, therefore, relative factor prices. It follows that 
labour market regulation contributes to comparative advantages in an open economy. “Rigid” countries 
that have relative high labour costs tend to specialise in capital intensive goods and face higher 
unemployment. Conversely, and this is the main difference with Davis, “flexible” economies benefit in 
terms of employment from trade with “rigid” countries, which increases demand for labour intensive 
                                                 
1
  In a different context, Krugman (1995) emphasises that the impact of trade with developing countries on wages and 
employment depends on the functioning of the labour market: trade effects are likely to be mostly reflected by changes in wages 
in flexible economies and in employment levels in rigid ones. 
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goods. Through trade and induced changes in factor prices, comparative advantages in labour market 
institutions enable “flexible” economies to transfer some of the regulation costs to “rigid” economies. 
 
Secondly, this study provides the first empirical investigation of the impact of interactions between 
relative labour market institutions and bilateral trade on unemployment. In this research area relying 
on macro panel data, caution is required concerning the interpretation of empirical results because of 
data limitations. Nevertheless, the idea that these interactions influence unemployment receives some 
support, potentially contributing to the unemployment rate by several half-percentage points in some 
countries. Belgium, Finland and Sweden seem to be the countries that suffer the most from the trade-
regulation interactions, while Portugal and Switzerland are estimated to be the main beneficiaries, 
although the advantages have decreased for the latter country. In addition, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom might have benefited the most from the changes in these interactions since the early 
80s. Another interesting finding is that a low regulated country like Canada can be negatively affected 
because its main trading partner is even less regulated, while a large high regulated country like 
Germany appears rather sheltered because its trading partners highly regulate also.     
 
This paper is part of the rapidly expanding literature highlighting that labour market institutions 
generate comparative advantages (see e.g. Davidson, Martin and Matusz, 1999; Moore and Ranjan, 
2005; Cuñat and Melitz, 2007; Helpman and Itskhoki, 2007). Its focus is also closely related to the 
issue of interactions between shocks and labour market institutions, which has received prominent 
attention following the seminal paper by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), BW hereafter. BW highlight 
that, even though labour market institutions could explain much of the differences in unemployment 
across countries either in the eighties or the nineties, changes in institutions through time were too 
small to account for the changes in unemployment rates. This position is also defended by Ball (1999), 
but is controversial, and section 2 discusses the empirical evidence related to this debate. As a result, 
BW turn their attention to the hypothesis that labour market institutions might affect the sensitivity of 
unemployment to shocks. The rationale is, firstly, that rigidities can prevent the adjustment of wages in 
the advent of negative shocks, which might generate unemployment, and, secondly, that differences in 
rigidities are related to differences in institutions. BW find evidence that the mostly common shocks 
that affected developed countries had differentiated impacts based on differences in labour market 
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institutions. However, Blanchard (2006) concludes that these explanations are only partly satisfactory 
and encourages researchers to search for other shocks and other interactions.  
 
There is a major difference between BW’s hypothesis and the channel implied by the Davis-type 
mechanism. The former seems implicitly optimistic in that the effects of labour market institutions, 
albeit persistent, are not a long term phenomenon, either because the “shocks” will revert / vanish over 
time or because bad institutions only slow the necessary adjustments. However, although trade 
expansion can be treated as a “shock” in the empirical analysis, this “shock” is permanent and the 
interactions between trade and labour market institutions affect the unemployment rate in the long run. 
Besides, this effect is clearly distinct from the temporary rise in unemployment caused by imports, 
which lasts until employment reallocates across firms and sectors, and fully adjusts to the new 
competitive environment. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews briefly the empirical evidence 
on the role of institutions in explaining unemployment. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework on 
which the empirical investigation in Section 4 is based. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Stylized facts and related literature 
Searching for determinants of unemployment among the shock / institution interactions has been 
motivated by the assessment that the explanations relying solely on labour market institutions had 
three major shortcomings. Firstly, it could not account for the fact that in the 50s and 60s the flexible 
labour market economies recorded higher unemployment than the already more regulated European 
economies.2 Secondly, the empirical evidence was considered not to be terribly robust. Thirdly, the 
changes in regulations seemed too small to account for the extent of the changes in the 
unemployment rates.    
 
Aggregating data, which is described in section 4, across 20 OECD countries provides the broad 
picture represented in Figure 1. The non-weighted average unemployment rate started to increase 
                                                 
2
 This stylized fact is a major theoretical challenge. To my knowledge, only the calibrated model of Ljungqvist and Sargent 
(2005) can reproduce it. 
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sharply in the mid-seventies reaching a peak at a level that was 5.5 percentage points higher a 
decade later. The following decade was U-shaped with a trough in 1990 and a new record peak at 
9.2% in 1993. Then, the average unemployment rate receded and, since the end of the nineties, it has 
stabilised between 6.5% and 7.5% a level comparable to those reached in the eighties.  
 
Turning to the institution variables, there has been a clear upward trend in both the average benefit 
replacement rate and tax wedge, with an increase of 24 and 18 percentage points over 1960-1998, 
respectively (Figure 1a). The pattern of the replacement rate seems to fit that of the unemployment 
rate closely, at least until the end of the eighties, while the pace of the increase in the average tax 
wedge appears rather disconnected from the unemployment rate trend. Neither of these two institution 
variables is able to match the waves in the unemployment rate from the mid-eighties. Figure 1b shows 
that the evolution in bargaining coordination, employment protection (both a 0-2 index) and union 
density has been hump-shaped. Average coordination increased slightly until the mid-seventies and 
then decreased significantly until the mid-eighties. Employment protection increased until the mid-
eighties, especially between the mid-sixties and mid-seventies, and has decreased slightly since then. 
Average union density evolved in a tight range between 38% and 46% over the whole period. Finally, 
the evolution of the average import ratio matches that of the unemployment rate reasonably well until 
1990, but the peaks and trough seem to have been disconnected since then. These are only 
descriptive average statistics and only the empirical analysis might disentangle the various effects.  
 
The aim here is not to produce one more review of the empirical literature about the impact of 
institutions, but simply to synthesise the debate. Very good surveys can be found in Nickell, Nunziata 
and Ochiel (2005), and in both Baker, Glyn, Howell and Schmitt (2005) and Baccaro and Rei (2005) 
for a sceptical view on the evidence produced up to now. Saint-Paul (2004) argues that changes in 
institutions have been significant in the last decades and can explain the magnitude of the trends in 
unemployment rates. The most comprehensive effort to match the changes in unemployment with 
those in institutions is probably that of Nickell et al. They find support for the regulatory view of 
unemployment and assess that the shock interactions à la Blanchard and Wolfers are not robust, 
when added to their thorough specification. However, based on absolute numbers and comparison 
across studies, Baker and al. note that some of the parameters reported by Nickell et al. do not seem 
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realistic. Following a rigorous empirical strategy, Bassanini and Duval (2006) reach more moderate 
conclusions as for the role of institutions, either directly or through the interactions with shocks.  
 
Rather than taking a determined position on this debate, this paper focuses on another interaction 
related to another “shock”, which has been surprisingly discarded so far and might complement other 
explanations of the unemployment patterns. The amount of empirical work accumulated to date on the 
institutional determinants of unemployment induces any researcher to modesty regarding the 
conclusions that can be drawn from time-series cross-section macro data.3 Multi-collinearity plagues 
the data, which weakens the confidence one might place in the significance of a specific parameter. 
Nevertheless, as a starting point, three inferences look particularly robust across studies. Firstly, there 
is certainly no evidence that, since the seventies, regulating the labour market is good, with one 
caveat leading to the second inference. A robust finding across studies is that bargaining coordination 
is employment friendly. Thirdly, taking the data at face value, regulation seemed beneficial in the 
sixties and detrimental in the nineties. The last point is illustrated in Figure 2. Based on yearly data 
covering the twenty countries under study, each graph plots the linear correlation coefficient per 
decade between the unemployment rate and a given institution variable. Very similar patterns are 
obtained whether these correlations are computed from annual data or 10-year averages. Concerning 
the replacement rate, the correlation was negative in the sixties and turned positive afterwards. With 
benefit duration, the correlation was negative in the first two decades and positive in the last two. With 
employment protection and bargaining coordination, the correlation is negative, except in the nineties. 
There is a similar pattern for the tax wedge, although the positive correlation in the nineties is higher. 
These bivariate correlations are consistent with the view that the impact of labour market institutions 
on unemployment has varied over time.           
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 As noted by Blanchard (2006), “it is clear however that the number of potential shocks, institutions, and interactions is 
sufficiently large that the ability of such panel data regressions to tell us what exact combination matters is limited. Such 
regressions allow us to check for simple and partial correlations; they are unlikely to tell us about which combination of shocks 
and institutions is responsible for unemployment”. 
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3. Theory 
The proposed theoretical model embeds the large-firm version of the matching model of Pissarides 
(2000, chapter 3) into a Heckscher-Ohlin trade framework with two factors of production, capital K  
and labour L . The two factors could alternatively be thought of as being skilled and low skilled labour, 
as in Davis, with rigidities affecting mainly low skilled labour. Sub-section 3.1 summarises the insights 
of Pissarides model that are relevant for the impact of labour market institutions on unemployment, 
and Appendix 1 gives all the analytical details. Sub-section 3.2 integrates Davis’ (1998) rationale into 
the matching framework.  
 
3.1. The regulation view 
The equilibrium unemployment rate is negatively related to labour market tightness θ , defined as the 
ratio of vacancy positions to the number of unemployed people, according to: 
)(θθλ
λ
m
u
+
=                                                                                                                 (1) 
where (.)m is the matching function which decreases with θ  such that )(θθ m  increases with θ , and 
λ  is the exogenous separation rate. Equation (1) implies that the unemployment rate is negatively 
related to and unequivocally determined by labour market tightness. In this sub-section, the user cost 
of capital, Kc , is supposed to be given, whereas it is determined by factor endowments and 
preferences in the following sub-section. In the presence of adjustment costs of labour, represented by 
the cost, h , of a vacant position, profit maximization entails that the marginal product of labour is 
equal to the sum of the gross wages, w , and the expected capitalised value of the firm’s hiring costs:  
marginal product of labour )(/)( θλ mrhw ++=                                                                 (2) 
where r  denotes the discount rate. 
 
The Factor Price Frontier defines a negative relationship between the marginal product of labour and 
the user cost of capital: 
FPF:                    marginal product of labour 0',)( <= gcg K                                   (3) 
The combination of equations (2) and (3) leads to the price-setting or labour demand curve:  
price setting:     0',)()(/)( <−=+ gwcgmrh Kθλ                                                   (4) 
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Given Kc , the wage-setting curve represents the positively-sloped relation between tightness and 
bargained wages, w  : 
wage setting:     [ ])()1( Kcghzw ++−= θγργ                                                   (5) 
where z  represents the unemployment benefits, ρ  the tax wedge between gross and net of labour 
tax wages, γ  the workers’ bargaining power. The labour market equilibrium is represented by (E0) in 
Figure 3a. By eliminating w  in (4) and (5), the equilibrium tightness, and therefore the unemployment 
rate, is implicitly and uniquely determined by: 
labour market eq.:   [ ] 0,0,0,0,0)(1)( >∂
∂
>
∂
∂
>
∂
∂
>
∂
∂
>
∂
∂⇒−−=++ λργρ
γ
θ
λθγ u
h
uu
z
uu
zcg
hm
r
K         (6) 
 
Equation (6) captures the main features of the regulation view. Workers’ bargaining power, and 
therefore, union density, is positively related to the unemployment rate, because an increase in γ  
tends to push up wages, which reduces labour demand. An increase in the unemployment benefits 
leads to an increase in the unemployment rate, as it improves the outside option of workers in the 
bargaining process and therefore boosts wages. For the same reason, unemployment is positively 
related to the tax wedge, but only to the extent that an increase in the tax wedge, which drives down 
net wages, is not offset by lower unemployment benefits, i.e. to the extent that the wedge between net 
wages and benefits is reduced. Employment protection can be seen both as increasing the vacancy 
costs h  and as decreasing the separation rate λ . The former has a positive impact on the 
unemployment rate, while the latter has a negative one. Therefore, employment protection has an 
ambiguous effect overall. Finally, if coordination / centralization internalizes the negative externalities 
of too high wages and separation rates, it is associated with a lower γ  and λ , ceteris paribus. 
Therefore, coordination / centralization could be expected to reduce unemployment and considered a 
“good” institution in this framework. 
 
The cost of capital affects both the price-setting and wage-setting schedules. An increase in the cost 
of capital entails a decrease in the capital-labour ratio such that the marginal product of labour 
decreases to match the rise in Kc  along the factor price frontier (equation 3). This decrease in the 
marginal product of labour is achieved by a decrease in both tightness, hence a rise in unemployment, 
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and wages. Indeed, an increase in the user cost reduces labour demand, which tends to drive 
unemployment to higher levels as seen from (4). On the other hand, it deteriorates profits and exerts a 
negative pressure on bargained wages. Maintaining wages constant requires an increase in labour 
tightness, which tends to diminish unemployment as seen from (5). However, the net effect captured 
by (6) is unambiguous, as represented by the shift from (E0) to (E1) in Figure 3b: an increase in the 
user cost leads to both lower wages and higher unemployment.4 This channel plays a key role in the 
impact of trade because of the induced factor price changes.  
 
3.2. The magnification effect of trade  
The mechanism highlighted by Davis, who treats the case of trade between a minimum wage and a 
flexible wage economy, is now extended to the labour market framework presented above. There are 
two sectors in the economy and p  is the price of good 1 in terms of good 2, which is chosen as the 
numeraire. Good 1 is assumed to be capital intensive relative to good 2 at any factor prices. Let us 
focus on the link between the user cost of capital and the unemployment rate.  
 
Based on the above analysis, the labour market equilibrium defines a positive relation between the 
user cost of capital and the unemployment rate, which is represented by the positively-sloped RR 
curve in Figure 4, where R stands for regulation. Equation (6) implies that an increase in (bad) 
regulation shifts the RR curve to the upper left. Obviously, the cost of capital is not exogenous, and, 
according to the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, there is a negative relation between the price of the capital 
intensive good and the effective capital-labor endowment:  
0',)1( <



−
= ζζ
uN
Kp                                                                                           (7) 
where K  is the country’s capital stock and N  is total labour force. As long as the country produces 
both goods, the Stolper-Samuelson relation implies a positive relation between Kc  and p : 
0',)( >= ψψ pcK                                                                                                   (8) 
                                                 
4
 The reason why the total effect on employment is unambiguous is the following. For a given level of tightness, the decrease in 
the marginal product of labour, that is induced by an increase in the user cost, affects wages one to one as a result of the labour 
demand shift (eq. 4). However, it affects wages to a factor 1<γ  as a result of the wage curve shift (eq. 5). Hence, the effect of 
the labour demand shift dominates and employment decreases. 
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It follows from (7) and (8) that product market equilibrium implies a negative relationship between the 
unemployment rate and the cost of capital: an increase in the unemployment rate, by reducing the 
effective labour available to the economy, makes the labour intensive good relatively more expensive, 
hence a decrease in Kc :
5
 
product market equilibrium:   0',)( <= ϕϕ ucK                                                     (9) 
Importantly, this decreasing function only depends on the technical parameters of the production 
functions, on the relative factor endowment NK /  and on preferences. This means that labor market 
regulation does not affect this relation, which is labeled as the BD locus in Figure 5, where BD stands 
for Brecher-Davis. Therefore, equations (6) and (9) define the equilibrium unemployment rate and cost 
of capital at the intersection of the BD and RR schedules.  
 
The low regulation equilibrium is represented at point A*. Stricter regulation moves the equilibrium 
along the BD locus to a point like A. An increase in regulation triggers an increase in unemployment, a 
decrease in the user cost of capital, as well as in the price p  of the capital-intensive good. 
Consequently, because regulation affects relative prices, it creates comparative advantages even if 
factor endowments are identical. 
 
Suppose that two countries having the same relative factor endowments and preferences open up to 
trade. In that case, both countries share the same BD locus in the closed economy, which is also the 
BD relation in the integrated equilibrium. If both countries have the same level of regulation, then in 
this extended Heckscher-Ohlin framework, there is no trade and all prices and unemployment remain 
at their autarky level. Suppose now that the domestic country highly regulates its labour market as 
compared to the foreign country. The autarkic equilibrium are at point A and A* respectively in Figure 
5, where an asterisk superscript represents the foreign country. The integrated equilibrium takes place 
at the world unemployment rate Wu  and price Tp , which lies somewhere between p  and *p  based 
on the relative size of the two countries. At the price Tp ,  equilibrium in each country moves along the 
respective RR locus at points C and C*. Because the domestic country specializes in the capital-
                                                 
5
  It should be noted that the framework is a static one. Taking the dynamics of capital accumulation into account would amplify 
these mechanisms because of the substitution of capital to labour.  
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intensive good, the BD locus shifts rightwards for the domestic country and leftwards for the foreign 
country.6 In the domestic country, trade induces a joint increase in the user cost of capital and in the 
unemployment rate along the high regulation schedule RR, while the converse applies to the foreign 
country, leading to the aggregated unemployment rate Wu .  Therefore, the model highlights a testable 
positive relation between the unemployment rate of a given country and the interaction of trade with 
the difference between the regulation level of the country and that of its trading partner. 
 
Thus, the result obtained by Davis in the case where regulation is limited to minimum wages is 
extended to a more general regulation context, with one noticeable difference. In Davis, the low 
regulation country has flexible wages and therefore no unemployment in autarky, as well as in the 
trade equilibrium. Here, the low regulation country benefits in terms of employment from trade with a 
high regulation country, through a decrease in the user cost of capital, which boosts labour demand 
and tightens the labour market. 
 
When countries differ in their relative factor endowments, these interactions between trade and labour 
market regulations contribute to the establishment of comparative advantages. In the case of trade 
between a capital intensive developed country and a labour intensive developing one, relatively high 
regulation in the developed country would amplify the natural comparative advantages, whereas the 
latter would be somewhat attenuated if the developing is relatively highly regulated. However, 
regulation indicators are typically unavailable for developing countries, which makes this effect difficult 
to test in practice. Besides, institutional differences are likely to be secondary in this context. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
  Factors are supposed to be immobile internationally in the Heckscher-Ohlin context. This can be problematic if K is explicitly 
thought of as physical capital. However, in such a case, low return to capital in the “rigid” economy would lead to capital outflows 
that would shift the BD schedule upwards. This would produce similar results to the case of trade without capital mobility, 
because factor mobility is a substitute for trade in this model.   
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4. Empirical analysis 
 
4.1. Data 
The dataset used in this study is standard in this literature. It covers 20 countries over 1960-1998. The 
shock and time-invariant labour market institution variables used in BW are available through Justin 
Wolfers’ homepage.7 The time-varying institution variables were assembled by Nickell and Nunziata 
(2001) and are described in the appendix of Nickell et al.8  Although, the respective time-invariant and 
time-varying variables are not strictly the same, the linear correlation coefficient between the averages 
through time of the respective measures is of around 80% across countries. The bargaining 
coordination variable is a 2 to 6 index in BW, whereas it lies between 1 and 3 in the time-varying 
alternative. To make them comparable, the BW coordination variable is first divided by two. Then, the 
minimum value, i.e. 1, is subtracted from both variables, such that ‘no regulation’ is associated with 
zero, as with all the other institution variables. The benefit duration variable has no time-varying 
equivalent and therefore, the BW measure is kept as such.9 In BW, the employment protection is just a 
ranking of the countries. The measure of this institution has been refined since then, and the 0 to 2 
index from Nunziata was preferred. The reader is referred to section 1 of Nickell et al. for a description 
of the main changes in the institution variables over the period. Finally, bilateral trade data comes from 
the CHELEM database built by the CEPII. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table A1. 
 
4.2. First glance / Direct look at the interaction 
In order to get a first impression of the relevance of the interaction between trade and labour market 
regulation to explain unemployment, the unemployment rate is regressed on regulation indicators, 
LMR , and the interactions with the import ratio, IMPORTLMR * . Country and time fixed effects are 
included to control for country specificities and common time trend. In addition, the interaction term is 
itself interacted with the size of each country, measured by the log of the average population over the 
                                                 
7
 http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/data.shtml 
8
 Data is available at http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/number.asp?number=502. 
9
 The benefit duration variable BD in Nickell and Nunziata is a duration-weighted average of benefits paid during five years. It is 
substantially different form Ben in BW. For example, according to Ben, benefits in Spain are paid during three and a half years, 
which places Spain on the very generous side. On the contrary, according to BD, Spain is at the opposite of the scale with an 
index of 0 until 1980 and 0.30 afterwards. This helps tp understand why results are not robust when replacing Ben  by BD.  
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period, in order to account for the fact that small countries are both more open and specialized. As the 
effect highlighted in the model holds up to the point of complete specialization, the IMPORTLMR *  
effect might be lower for small countries. 
 
Table 1 presents the results treating each indicator separately, i.e. each row is associated with one 
regression within each panel of the table. The left panel is based on yearly data. As it is well known, 
the high persistence in the unemployment rate series induces a strong autocorrelation with yearly 
data. Regulation indicators have a low frequency and BW favour using 5-year averages in order to 
capture long-term effects, which leads to the results reported in the right panel. SIZE  is defined as the 
difference between the population (log) of the country and the average over all countries. It ranges 
from -1.6 for New Zealand to 2.7 for the USA (see Table A1). Therefore, the IMPORTLMR * parameter 
indicates the interaction effect for the average size country, whereas the LMR  parameter would 
correspond to the regulation effect of a closed average size economy. 
 
These illustrative estimates are broadly consistent across the two panels, despite the issue raised by 
autocorrelation with yearly data, and three general results stand out. Firstly, the non-interacted 
regulation indicators (closed economy) are never positively significant except for union density. In 
most cases, the results taken at face value would imply that employment protection, bargaining 
coordination and high replacement rate are favourable to employment in a closed economy. Secondly, 
the import interaction term is positive and highly significant: for an average size country, the sensitivity 
of unemployment to regulation increases with the level of openness and, reciprocally, imports have a 
detrimental impact on unemployment the more stringent the regulation level. Finally, the size effect is 
significant and for the smaller countries, the total interaction parameter is small, often close to zero. 
Overall, these first estimates provide some indications that the trade-regulation interaction might play 
some role.    
 
4.3. Appropriate interaction variables 
The model presented in section 3 highlights that the impact of trade in a high-regulation country 
depends on the regulation level of the trade partners. Therefore, the interaction term should be 
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defined as the product of the trade flows and the difference between the regulation levels of the trade 
partners. For each country i , time t  and regulation indicator kLMR , 
 ∑ −=
j
jktiktijtikt LMRLMRTRADELMRTRADE )(*                                                              (10) 
where ijtTRADE  is the average of bilateral imports and exports between countries i and j , as a ratio 
of country i GDP, and j  covers all the countries in the sample. 
 
Compared to either the institution indicator LMR  or the direct IMPORTLMR * used in the preceding 
sub-section, the refined variable LMRTRADE  can make a substantial difference.10 This point is 
illustrated by comparing the case of Canada and Germany. Canada is generally perceived as a low 
labour market regulation country, while Germany lies in the high regulation group, but the respective 
trade partners are also very different. Because Canada trades mostly with the United States, which 
regulates much less, trade might have a detrimental impact on Canadian unemployment based on the 
model above, whereas when Germany trades, for instance, with such high regulation countries as 
France, Belgium or Italy, German unemployment might not be affected.    
 
Let us focus on benefit replacement rate ( BRR ) and union density (UD ) represented in Figure 6. For 
both Canada and Germany, the benefit replacement rate evolved around 0.40 between 1968 and 
1998. However, the BRRTRADE  variable fell sharply in Germany, while for Canada, the levels at the 
beginning and end of the period are very similar. Two thirds of the changes in the German variable are 
explained by the increase in the benefit replacement rate over the period in Italy, Switzerland and 
Sweden of 0.36, 0.67 and 0.55 respectively. For union density, the impact on UDTRADE of the steady 
increase in unionization in Canada has been magnified by deunionisation in the USA leading to the 
contrasted patterns between Canada and Germany.  
 
The trade-regulation interactions are tested in various specifications. As shown in section 2, the impact 
of labour market institutions on unemployment seems to have evolved over time. This provides 
support for the shock-institution interaction hypothesis. Sub-sections 4.4 and 4.5 focus on common 
unobservable and specific shocks respectively, while sub-section 4.6 is devoted to the direct impact of 
                                                 
10
 Using imports rather than the average of imports and exports as the TRADE variable does not make noticeable differences. 
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labour market institutions. Because, as discussed above, the 5-year period is more adapted to the low 
frequency of the institution variables and the persistence of the unemployment series, the reminder of 
this study focuses on 5-year averages.    
 
4.4. Common unobservable shocks 
This sub-section starts by replicating BW results obtained with time-invariant institution variables from 
the following specification: 
itk
k
ikktiit eRMLLMRadcu +



−++= ∑ )(1                                                                    (11) 
where i  is a country index, k  an institution index and t  a 5-year period index. ic  and td  are country 
and time effects respectively. The impact of a common shock on unemployment depends on labour 
market institutions, kLMR , and ka  are the parameters associated with these interactions. Column 1 of 
Table 2 captures the main insights of BW.11 Based on these estimates, a country with the average 
levels of regulation would have experienced an increase of 6 points in the unemployment rate over the 
full period due to adverse shocks. Regulation magnifies the impact of a negative shock, except for 
bargaining coordination, which is a “good” institution moderating detrimental effects on employment.  
 
Let us now turn to the time-varying measures of institutions. As BW themselves note, the significance 
of some coefficients does not survive the use of these alternative measures. As seen from the results 
in columns 2 and 3, the tax wedge and union density variables are no longer significant with time-
varying measures of institutions. One additional difference compared to the first column lies in the time 
dummies. With time-invariant institutions, time dummies are determined up to a constant. However, 
with time-varying measures, one degree of freedom is gained. In so doing, a very robust finding 
emerges as regards the time-dummies distribution: although the difference between the first and last 
period dummies is still of around 6 points, the dummies are negative in the first periods and positive in 
the last ones. Using the shocks terminology, this would mean that shocks were positive in the sixties 
                                                 
11
 BW use two other institution variables, union coverage and active labour market policies. The former has no time-varying 
equivalent; the latter raises problematic endogeneity issues as active policies have been put in place following the rise in 
unemployment and the variable is available from 1985 only. In any case, these two variables have never appeared significant in 
the regressions herein, and have therefore been dropped. 
 16 
while turning negative in the second part of the seventies. Taken literally, data indicates that 
regulations were both detrimental from the eighties and beneficial in the sixties. However, the main 
inference that a negative shock is magnified by some regulations continues to hold notwithstanding.     
 
The specification in equation (11) is now supplemented with the inclusion of the trade interaction 
variables LMRTRADE  : 
it
k
iktkk
k
iktktiit eLMRTRADEbRMLLMRadcu ∑∑ ++



−++= )(1                                     (12) 
Results reported in columns 4 to 7 provide some support to the idea that trade with countries having a 
lower (higher) level of regulation is detrimental (beneficial) in terms of employment. Replacement rate, 
benefit duration, tax wedge and union density show up as significant once interacted with trade in the 
way described in 4.3, although collinearity prevents discriminating the effects of benefit duration and 
union density. Moreover, the ka  parameters are very little affected by the addition of the trade related 
variables, which implies that the trade interaction effect acts on top of the impacts highlighted by BW. 
Also, adding either IMPORT  or TRADE  to equation (12) does not alter the estimates significantly as 
the added parameter is not significantly different from zero, confirming that the effects of trade channel 
through labour market institutions. Sub-section 4.2 suggested that size might affect these trade 
regulation interactions. Unfortunately, given that there are six interaction variables, this size effect 
cannot easily be included herein. In an attempt to do so, the effect of country size is extracted from 
import and export ratios, i.e. only the residuals of the regression of the trade ratios on size are 
considered. Column 8 reports the estimates of (12) when LMRTRADE   variables are computed with 
the size-corrected trade variables. In addition to replacement rate and tax wedge, union density is 
significant once interacted with trade, whereas benefit duration is not.  
 
4.5. Specific shocks 
As in BW, we study the impact of three specific shocks that have been mostly common to the 
developed economies and related to the changes in real interest rate ( RIRS ), productivity growth 
(TFPS ) and labour demand ( LDS ). The shock variables are directly taken from the BW database. The 
full specification with these specific shocks is: 
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+= )(1                 (13) 
Table 3 is built according to the same rationale used for Table 2. In the first column, BW specification 
with time-invariant institutions is replicated. The three shocks show up significantly and regulations 
magnify the impact of these negative shocks, except employment protection, which is not significant 
(with the same negative coefficient for coordination as in the preceding sub-section). When the time-
varying measures are introduced in column 2, the slowdown in productivity growth stops playing a 
role, and only replacement rate, benefit duration and tax wedge are significant. Finally, when the 
trade-regulation interactions are added in column 3, the explanatory power is greatly increased and 
the trade variables interacted with the two dimensions of the unemployment insurance system, 
replacement rate and unemployment benefit, and with union density are positively significant. This 
applies to the direct trade ratios (column 3) or those that are corrected for the size effect (unreported). 
The interaction with employment protection is negatively signed but, as explained in the theoretical 
section, the expected effect is ambiguous. Overall, the results concerning the trade-regulation 
variables are broadly consistent with those obtained with common unobservable shocks.     
 
4.6. Direct impact of labour market institutions 
Nickell et al. argue that the direct effects of institutions on unemployment dominate those obtained 
with shock interactions. In order to test whether the trade-regulation interactions are robust when the 
direct effects are introduced, the following specification is tested, with results reported in Table 4: 
 it
k
iktk
k
iktktiit eLMRTRADEbLMRadcu ∑∑ ++++=                                                          (14) 
The first two columns omit the trade-regulation interactions. Column (1) includes time-dummies and 
column (2) adds country-specific time trends, as advocated by Nickell et al. Indeed, without the shock 
interactions, these specific trends are necessary to control for the contrasted evolution of the 
unemployment rate across countries. The evidence in favour of the “regulation view” is mixed at best. 
The third column adds trade-regulation interactions. All the interaction parameters are positive, 
although only replacement rate and employment protection are significant (tax wedge almost is).  
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4.7. Quantification of the impact of trade-regulation interactions  
Obviously as in BW, the specification in (12) does a good job in fitting the different evolutions of 
unemployment across countries. The specific interest here is on the contribution of the trade-
regulation interactions and Figure 7 plots the actual unemployment rate in bold and the estimated rate 
from equation (12) (column 4 in Table 2) in grey. The dotted line corresponds to the fitted 
unemployment rate once the trade-regulation effect has been subtracted. In other words, the 
contribution of the interactions between trade and labour market institutions is read from the difference 
between the grey and the dotted lines. It represents the impact of bilateral trade on unemployment 
given the differences in regulation between trading partners, or reciprocally, the impact of differences 
in regulations given the level of trade.  
 
The countries that would suffer the most from these interactions are Belgium, Finland and Sweden 
(France and Canada to a lesser extent) while the main beneficiaries would be Portugal and 
Switzerland, based on the estimated effect for the most recent period (Table 5). The comparison 
between the adjusted R² of the third and fourth columns in Table 2 seems to indicate that the trade-
regulation interactions carries a low explanatory power. This assessment is misleading because the 
other explanatory variables in the third column, including the country and time fixed effects, partly 
compensate for omitting the trade interactions. In fact, the trade-regulation interactions contribute to 
21% of the total unemployment rate variance, when using column (4) for example, and account for 
several percentage points of unemployment rate for some countries. However, the interpretation of the 
impact in levels should be taken cautiously since country size might not be controlled for satisfactorily.      
 
Therefore, another instructive way to look at this contribution consists in looking at changes through 
periods, as country dummies must be included in the empirical model. Table 6 reports, for each 
country, the changes in the unemployment rate and in the trade-regulation component over the total 
period, over the first half during which the increase in unemployment has been widespread and, finally, 
over the second half where the performances have been contrasted across countries with some of 
them succeeding to reduce unemployment.12  
                                                 
12
 1960/65 has some missing data, hence the choice of 1965/1970 for the first period providing more reliable correlation 
parameters, but there is no major differences between the two. 
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Five main results stand out. First, the changes in trade-regulation interactions seem to play no role in 
the deterioration of employment in the first half, whereas they are significantly correlated to the 
contrasted evolutions in the second half, as indicated by the cross-country correlation that is reported 
in the last row. Second, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom benefited the most, by 2.3 and 1.1 
points respectively, from the changes in trade and regulation comparative advantages during the 
second period. Third, Belgium, Finland and Sweden consistently lost in the two half periods from 
changes in the trade-regulation interactions, although that contribution is much lower for Sweden in 
the second half. This is also the case for Canada and Switzerland to a lesser extent. Fourth, some 
countries were negatively affected during the first half, but managed to improve the situation in the 
second period. Ireland, Denmark, Norway and New Zealand are in this situation, whereas the opposite 
applies to Italy. Finally, the largest countries in Continental Europe, Germany and France, appear 
mostly insulated from the changes in the interactions.  
 
5. Conclusion 
There is ample evidence that a country’s labour market institutions are important determinants of 
unemployment, either directly or through the propagation of shocks. This paper imbeds the rationale of 
Davis (1998) into the labour market search framework of Pissarides (2000). The main argument is that 
the institutions of the trade partners matter also for a country’s equilibrium unemployment rate. 
Because institutions affect relative prices, they contribute to comparative advantages and boost or 
weaken demand for labour intensive goods depending on relative labour market regulations. 
Consequently, trade might magnify the consequences of either a bad or a good institutional setting.  
 
The empirical investigation provides some evidence that the interactions between bilateral trade and 
relative labour market regulations affect the unemployment rate. Given data limitations in this area, the 
ambition of this paper is merely to draw the attention to the general relevance of these interactions as 
complementing the other explanations of persistent unemployment. More efforts should be placed in 
trying to identify such mechanisms in country case studies. In particular, how country size influences 
the nature and magnitude of these effects via greater specialisation remains a challenging issue.  
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Confirmation of these results could have important political implications. Although an overall welfare 
analysis is missing, for those would endorse the “regulation view” of unemployment, these results are 
good news as they seem to imply that economic integration fosters labour market deregulation. Even 
for some others who consider that optimal regulation is the outcome of a trade-off, they would suggest 
that the terms of the trade-off change with the opening of the economy. Incentives to non-
cooperatively deregulate the labour market might be reinforced with integration, and desire to preserve 
the so-called “social models” might create resistance to open up to low regulation economies. In that 
case, deregulating the labour market could generate a negative externality for trading partners, raising 
the possibility that cooperation in setting labour market policies enables to reach a better equilibrium.     
 
 
Appendix: Search model 
There are two sectors in the economy and sector 1 produces the capital intensive good of price p  in 
terms of good 2, which is chosen as the numeraire. The labor market framework is the large-firm 
version of the matching model of Pissarides (2000, chapter 3). Let iK  and iL  be the capital and 
employment of firm i , and let ),( iij LKF  be the constant returns-to-scale production function of all 
firms in sector j . Each firm is large enough so that there is no uncertainty about its flow of labour. 
Wages are bargained at the individual level and firms choose the number of jobs by taking wages as 
given, that is firms have the “right-to-manage”. During a small interval dt , a vacant job is matched to 
an unemployed worker with probability dtm )(θ , where m  is the matching function and θ  labour 
market tightness, defined as the ratio of vacancy to unemployment rates. Usual properties of the 
matching function, discussed at greater length in Pissarides (2000) are supposed to hold: 
)()(',0)(' θθθθ mmm <<                                                                                       (A1) 
We assume that labour market tightness is exogenous to the firm’s control and that each firm loses 
workers at the rate λ . Each vacancy costs the firm h  in recruitment costs and returns a worker at the 
rate )(θm . Therefore, denoting iV  the vacancies at firm i , the law of motion of job is: 
iii VmLL )(θλ +−=&                                                                                                       (A2) 
Aggregating across all firms gives the steady-state unemployment rate: 
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Unambiguously, given (A3), the unemployment rate is negatively related to labour market tightness. I  
representing the investment of price Kp , δ  the depreciation rate of capital stock, w  the gross wage 
and r  the discount rate, firm i in sector j  maximizes the present-discounted value of expected 
profits: 
[ ]∫ −−−=Π ∞ −0
,
),( dtIphVLwLKFpeMax iKiiiiijjrti
IV ii
  with   pp =1  and 12 =p         (A4) 
                        s.c.  iiiiii VmLLKIK ).(, θλδ +−=−= &&  
Let iii LKk /=  be the capital per unit of labour and iiijij LLKFkf /),()( = , first-order conditions write 
as, for 2,1=j : 
KKijjiijKj crpkfpLKFp ≡+== )()(),( ' δ                                                                 (A5a) 
[ ] )( )()()(),( ' θλm rhwkfkkfpLKFp iijiijjiijLj ++=−=                                             (A5b) 
Equation (A5a) implies that the capital-labour ratio in the numeraire good 2 is negatively related to the 
user cost of capital )( δ+≡ rpc KK and is the same for each firm in a given sector. Combining this with 
(A5b) leads to the Factor Price Frontier, where (.)2g  depends on the characteristics of the numeraire 
good, hence the subscript index, 2:  
                           0',)()(
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                                                                            (A6) 
(the positive relation between the relative price p  of the capital intensive good and the user cost of 
capital is implicitly given by )/()( 12 pcgpcg KK =  where 1g  is the counterpart of 2g  for good 1. This 
leads to equation 8 in the main text). The expression of the Factor Price Frontier in equation (A6) 
illustrates that the adjustment cost of labour, represented by h , creates a wedge between the 
marginal product of labour and the gross wage. Let oJ  and vJ  be the present-discounted values of 
expected profit from an occupied and vacant job respectively. Bellman equations lead to: 
)()( vov JJmhrJ −+−= θ                                                                                       (A7a) 
)()()( voKjjo JJkrpwkfprJ −−+−−= λδ                                                         (A7b) 
In equilibrium, profit opportunities drive rents from vacant jobs to zero, i.e. 0=vJ , implying: 
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This downward-sloping relationship between wages and labour market tightness is similar to labour 
demand and referred to as the job creation condition. Conversely, let eW  and uW  denote the present-
discounted value of the expected income stream of an employed and unemployed worker respectively. 
Denoting z  the unemployment benefits and ρ  the tax wedge between gross and net of labor tax 
wage: 
)()( ueu WWmzrW −+= θθ                                                                                 (A9a) 
)(/ uee WWwrW −−= λρ                                                                                     (A9b) 
Equations (A9a-b) are solved as follows: 
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The negotiated wage is the outcome of the Nash bargaining which boils down to maximizing the 
weighted product of the worker’s and the firm’s surpluses from the match, the weight γ  representing 
workers’ bargaining power: 
γγ −
−−=
1)()(maxarg voue JJWWw                                                                         (A11) 
Using (A8) and (A10), the first-order condition with respect to wages leads to: 
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This positive relation between tightness and wages is the wage-setting curve. Combining the wage-
setting curve and the Factor Price Frontier leads to the unique equilibrium determining labour market 
tightness as a function of the cost of capital: 
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which ensures that the following sensitivities are satisfied: 
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or equivalently,  
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Clearly, if the unemployment benefits are indexed to net wages, i.e. if ρ/wbz = , b  being a constant, 
the tax wedge disappears from the wage-setting function and has therefore no impact on the 
equilibrium unemployment rate. This illustrates that, within this framework, the impact of the tax wedge 
channels exclusively through the ratio of gross wages to unemployment benefits.  
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Table A1 : Descriptive statistics 
Average institution variables ( LMR ) and size 
 
 replace- 
ment rate 
benefit 
duration 
 
employment 
protection 
tax wedge union 
density 
bargaining 
coordination 
size 
aus 0.22 3.50 0.50 0.38 0.37 1.01 -0.09 
aut 0.27 2.50 0.99 0.56 0.43 1.46 -0.76 
bel 0.47 3.50 1.31 0.45 0.39 1.13 -0.50 
can 0.41 0.25 0.30 0.42 0.25 0.13 0.42 
dnk 0.52 2.00 0.98 0.52 0.62 1.72 -1.16 
fin 0.34 2.50 1.18 0.54 0.52 0.99 -1.21 
fra 0.56 2.88 1.08 0.62 0.08 0.96 1.20 
ger 0.40 3.50 1.33 0.48 0.24 1.50 1.58 
irl 0.37 3.50 0.37 0.34 0.43 1.49 -1.58 
ita 0.12 0.00 1.92 0.59 0.30 0.91 1.23 
jpn 0.32 0.00 1.40 0.30 0.20 1.50 1.95 
nld 0.64 2.50 1.33 0.51 0.24 1.62 -0.14 
nor 0.38 1.00 1.52 0.60 0.44 1.86 -1.38 
nzl 0.30 3.50 0.80 0.28 0.26 1.09 -1.63 
por 0.50 0.15 1.88 0.30 0.38 0.91 -0.53 
spa 0.59 3.00 1.90 0.32 0.03 1.51 0.81 
swe 0.50 0.70 1.09 0.66 0.67 1.61 -0.67 
swi 0.32 0.50 0.55 0.34 0.20 0.88 -0.92 
uk 0.29 3.50 0.29 0.45 0.38 0.38 1.25 
usa 0.27 0.00 0.10 0.42 0.13 0.00 2.66 
 
 
Average trade-institution interaction variables ( LMRTRADE ) 
 
Trade 
interacted 
with 
 
replacement 
rate 
benefit 
duration 
employment 
protection 
tax wedge union density bargaining 
coordination 
aus -0.010 0.263 -0.032 -0.001 0.018 0.025 
aut -0.018 0.038 -0.047 0.018 0.043 0.049 
bel 0.011 0.509 0.095 -0.032 0.087 0.002 
can 0.028 -0.032 0.001 0.002 0.022 -0.023 
dnk 0.042 -0.026 -0.039 0.008 0.080 0.125 
fin -0.010 0.096 0.026 0.007 0.036 -0.024 
fra 0.027 0.096 -0.003 0.021 -0.031 -0.014 
ger -0.009 0.301 0.070 -0.004 -0.009 0.091 
irl 0.014 0.378 -0.121 -0.057 0.051 0.394 
ita -0.040 -0.331 0.109 0.013 0.011 -0.018 
jpn 0.000 -0.055 0.044 -0.007 -0.001 0.047 
nld 0.106 -0.035 0.093 0.010 -0.022 0.231 
nor -0.004 -0.352 0.173 0.022 0.026 0.217 
nzl -0.001 0.325 0.028 -0.025 -0.003 0.046 
por 0.018 -0.622 0.154 -0.047 0.029 -0.042 
spa 0.026 0.112 0.090 -0.018 -0.023 0.053 
swe 0.038 -0.328 0.036 0.046 0.089 0.098 
swi 0.005 -0.411 -0.148 -0.040 -0.017 -0.054 
uk -0.021 0.292 -0.117 -0.004 0.020 -0.120 
usa -0.006 -0.065 -0.036 0.000 -0.007 -0.039 
 
Notes  
The size variable is the difference between the log of the population and that of the average across countries. The trade-
interaction variables are defined for each institution k by eq.(10): ∑ −=
j
jktiktijtikt LMRLMRTRADELMRTRADE )(*   
where ijtTRADE  is the average of imports and exports between countries i and j , as a ratio of country i GDP, and j  covers 
all the countries in the sample. 
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Table 1 
 
Trade-regulation interactions, each labour market institution separately 
 
For each institution kLMR separately, the following specification is estimated: 
ittiiitiktkitiktkiktkit veeSIZEIMPORTLMRcIMPORTLMRbLMRau +++++= ***  
 
 
Panel A 
 
Yearly data 
 
Panel B  
 
Five-year periods 
Regulation variable LMR  
IMPORT
LMR
*
 
SIZE
IMPORT
LMR
*
*  
 
LMR  
IMPORT
LMR
*
 
SIZE
IMPORT
LMR
*
*  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Replacement rate -0.044*** 
(0.010) 
0.113*** 
(0.032) 
0.133*** 
(0.013) 
 
-0.028 
(0.022) 
0.068 
(0.076) 
0.138*** 
(0.026) 
Benefit duration na 0.048*** 
(0.005) 
 
0.023*** 
(0.005) 
na 0.058*** 
(0.010) 
0.029*** 
(0.011) 
Employment 
protection 
-0.037*** 
(0.004) 
 
0.094*** 
(0.011) 
0.021*** 
(0.008) 
-0.042*** 
(0.009) 
0.133*** 
(0.023) 
0.028* 
(0.015) 
Tax wedge 0.012 
(0.016) 
 
0.171*** 
(0.033) 
0.136*** 
(0.018) 
0.028 
(0.028) 
0.189*** 
(0.067) 
0.114*** 
(0.039) 
Union density 0.088*** 
(0.015) 
-0.014 
(0.038) 
 
-0.023 
(0.024) 
0.102*** 
(0.031) 
-0.088 
(0.086) 
-0.050 
(0.053) 
Coordination -0.019*** 
(0.004) 
 
0.052*** 
(0.010) 
 
0.015** 
(0.006) 
-0.023*** 
(0.008) 
0.056*** 
(0.010) 
0.018 
(0.012) 
       
Country effects yes 
 
yes 
Time effects yes 
 
yes 
Nb obs 
 
between 730 and 748 between 155 and 159 
 
 
 
Note 
In each panel, each row corresponds to a separate estimation. Estimates are produced from an iterated GLS estimator taking 
into account heteroscedasticity across countries. The benefit duration variable is time-invariant. IMPORT is the import 
penetration rate, while SIZE  is defined as the difference of the log of the population of a given country and the average over 
all countries. Therefore, the IMPORTLMR * parameter indicates the interaction effect for the average size country, whereas 
the LMR  parameter would correspond to the regulation effect of a closed economy. 
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Table 2 
 
Institutions interacted with trade and common unobservable shocks  
it
k
iktkk
k
iktktiit vLMRTRADEbRMLLMRadcu ∑∑ ++



−++= )(1  
 Time-
invariant 
institutions 
Time-
varying 
institutions 
Time-
varying 
Institutions 
Time-
varying 
institutions 
Time-
varying 
institutions 
Time-
varying 
institutions 
Time-
varying 
institutions 
Time-
varying 
institutions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Regulation  variables (LMR) 
 
      
Replacement 
rate 
0.800*** 
(0.234) 
 
1.186*** 
(0.319) 
1.123*** 
(0.294) 
1.081*** 
(0.266) 
1.173*** 
(0.289) 
1.152*** 
(0.288) 
1.143*** 
(0.274) 
1.261*** 
(0.289) 
Benefit 
duration 
0.269*** 
(0.026) 
 
0.282*** 
(0.033) 
0.290*** 
(0.034) 
0.305*** 
(0.037) 
0.316*** 
(0.040) 
0.303*** 
(0.039) 
0.342*** 
(0.034) 
0.334*** 
(0.034) 
 
Employment 
protection 
0.522*** 
(0.082) 
 
0.481*** 
(0.125) 
0.435*** 
(0.118) 
0.570*** 
(0.130) 
0.607*** 
(0.126) 
0.613*** 
(0.125) 
0.521*** 
(0.115) 
0.455*** 
(0.120) 
Tax wedge 1.616*** 
(0.421) 
 
-0.376 
(0.464) 
      
Union 
density 
0.528* 
(0.289) 
 
0.289 
(0.367) 
      
Coordination -0.330*** 
(0.040) 
 
-0.428*** 
(0.114) 
-0.400*** 
(0.105) 
-0.489*** 
(0.122) 
-0.557*** 
(0.111) 
-0.571*** 
(0.112) 
-0.485** 
(0.106) 
-0.476*** 
(0.115) 
Regulation-Trade interaction  variables (LMRTRADE) 
 
      
Replacement 
rate 
   0.204** 
(0.087) 
 
0.171*** 
(0.062) 
0.183*** 
(0.063) 
0.156*** 
(0.065) 
0.208** 
(0.099) 
Benefit 
duration 
   0.052 
(0.034) 
 
0.046 
(0.035) 
0.062* 
(0.033) 
 
 
0.040 
(0.034) 
Employment 
protection 
   0.010 
(0.030) 
 
   -0.024 
(0.029) 
Tax wedge    0.294*** 
(0.111) 
 
0.296*** 
(0.110) 
0.357*** 
(0.116) 
0.269*** 
(0.113) 
0.298*** 
(0.102) 
Union 
density 
   0.094 
(0.076) 
 
0.089 
(0.073) 
 0.132** 
(0.067) 
0.187** 
(0.086) 
Coordination    -0.017 
(0.021) 
   -0.019 
(0.025) 
         
First period 
dummy 
x 
 
-0.032*** 
(0.009) 
 
-0.030*** 
(0.008) 
-0.047*** 
(0.016) 
-0.039*** 
(0.009) 
-0.039*** 
(0.009) 
-0.045** 
(0.010) 
-0.042*** 
(0.016) 
Last period 
dummy 
x+0.060*** 
(0.005) 
0.034*** 
(0.006) 
0.034*** 
(0.005) 
0.016 
(0.012) 
 
0.022*** 
(0.006) 
0.023*** 
(0.006) 
0.018** 
(0.007) 
0.017 
(0.012) 
Country 
effects 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adj R² 
 
0.861 0.843 0.845 0.856 0.858 0.857 0.857 0.865 
Nb obs 160 155 157 154 154 154 154 154 
 
Note 
Data are based on five-year periods. Estimates are produced from non-linear least squares with heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard-errors. In column (8), the trade variable that is used to compute the trade-regulation interactions discounts the effect of 
country size. 
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Table 3 
 
Institutions interacted with trade and specific shocks 
it
k
iktkk
k
iktk
l
iltliit vLMRTRADEbRMLLMRaSHOCKscu ∑∑∑ ++



−+



+= )(1  
 Time-
invariant 
institutions 
Time-
varying 
institutions 
Time-
varying 
institutions 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Specific shocks    
Real interest rate 0.434*** 
(0.076) 
 
0.449*** 
(0.068) 
0.368*** 
(0.061) 
TFP 0.458*** 
(0.117) 
 
-0.039 
(0.087) 
0.140 
(0.089) 
Labour demand 0.161** 
(0.071) 
0.080* 
(0.043) 
0.017 
(0.033) 
    
Regulation  variables (LMR) 
  
Replacement rate 1.268** 
(0.506) 
 
1.881** 
(0.877) 
1.216 
(0.947) 
Benefit duration 0.235*** 
(0.055) 
 
0.455*** 
(0.125) 
0.324** 
(0.130) 
Employment 
protection 
0.051 
(0.187) 
 
0.183 
(0.300) 
0.992** 
(0.417) 
Tax wedge 4.924*** 
(0.926) 
 
4.218*** 
(1.537) 
2.462* 
(1.504) 
Union density 1.849*** 
(0.667) 
 
-0.587 
(0.911) 
-1.956 
(1.331) 
Coordination -0.366*** 
(0.120) 
-0.383 
(0.259) 
-0.584 
(0.470) 
    
Regulation-Trade interaction variables (LMRTRADE) 
Replacement rate   0.221*** 
(0.078) 
 
Benefit duration   0.162*** 
(0.044) 
 
Employment 
protection 
  -0.095*** 
(0.034) 
 
Tax wedge   0.035 
(0.164) 
 
Union density   0.335** 
(0.151) 
 
Coordination   -0.018 
(0.024) 
 
Country effects yes yes yes 
Adj R² 0.636 0.629 0.716 
Nb obs 131 129 129 
 
Note 
Data are based on five-year periods. Estimates are produced from non-linear least squares with heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard-errors.  
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Table 4 
 
Direct impact of institutions and trade-regulation interactions 
it
k
iktk
k
iktktiit vLMRTRADEbLMRadcu ∑∑ ++++=  
 Time-
invariant 
institutions 
Time-
varying 
institutions 
Time-
varying 
institutions 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Direct effect of regulation  variable (LMR) 
 
Replacement rate -0.028** 
(0.012) 
 
0.040** 
(0.020) 
-0.049 
(0.049) 
Benefit duration na 
 
 
na 
 
na 
 
Employment 
protection 
-0.013* 
(0.007) 
 
-0.022*** 
(0.006) 
-0.056*** 
(0.013) 
Tax wedge 0.075** 
(0.035) 
 
-0.043 
(0.039) 
-0.037 
(0.068) 
Union density 0.078*** 
(0.023) 
 
0.056 
(0.039) 
0.020 
(0.068) 
Coordination -0.005 
(0.005) 
 
-0.008* 
(0.005) 
-0.018 
(0.012) 
Regulation-Trade interaction  variable (LMRTRADE) 
 
Replacement rate   0.402** 
(0.158) 
 
Benefit duration   0.037 
(0.036) 
 
Employment 
protection 
  0.163*** 
(0.056) 
 
Tax wedge   0.380 
(0.247) 
 
Union density   0.243 
(0.264) 
 
Coordination   0.026 
(0.041) 
    
Country effects yes yes yes 
Time dummies yes yes yes 
Country specific time 
trend 
no yes yes 
Adj R² 0.780 0.875 0.884 
Nb obs 155 155 152 
 
Note 
Data are based on five-year periods. Standard-errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.  
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Table 5 
 
Impact of the trade-institution interactions 
 on the unemployment rate, late 1990s 
 
 Impact on the 
unemployment 
rate, percent 
 
Belgium 1.5 < x 
Sweden 1.5 < x 
Finland 1.5 < x 
Canada 1.5 < x 
France 1.5 < x 
Australia 0.5 < x < 1.5 
Denmark 0.5 < x < 1.5 
Germany 0.5 < x < 1.5 
Ireland (Rep.) 0.5 < x < 1.5 
Spain 0.5 < x < 1.5 
New Zealand -0.5 < x < 0.5 
United Kingdom -0.5 < x < 0.5 
Austria -0.5 < x < 0.5 
Netherlands -0.5 < x < 0.5 
Norway -0.5 < x < 0.5 
Japan -0.5 < x < 0.5 
United States -1.5 < x < -0.5 
Italy -1.5 < x < -0.5 
Switzerland < -1.5 
Portugal < -1.5 
 
Note 
The total effect of the interactions is computed for the 1995 + period based on the estimated parameters reported 
in table 2, column 4. Hierarchy is not sensitive to the choice of specification. 
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Table 6 
 
Changes in the unemployment rate and in the trade-regulation interaction effects 
 
Period  
 
65+ to 95+ 
 
65+ to 80+ 
 
80+ to 95+ 
 
 Observed 
changes 
in the 
unempl. 
rate 
Changes in 
the trade-
regulation 
interaction 
effects  
 
Observed 
changes 
in the 
unempl. 
rate 
Changes in 
the trade-
regulation 
interaction 
effects  
 
Observed 
changes 
in the 
unempl. 
rate 
Changes 
in the 
trade-
regulation 
interaction 
effects  
 
Netherlands 4.4 -2.7 6.3 -0.4 -1.9 -2.3 
United Kingdom 5.9 -1.1 8.5 0.0 -2.6 -1.1 
Denmark 4.7 1.4 6.3 2.1 -1.6 -0.7 
New Zealand 6.3 0.8 3.7 1.2 2.7 -0.4 
Austria 3.9 0.1 1.0 0.5 3.0 -0.4 
Ireland (Rep.) 5.4 2.0 7.2 2.4 -1.8 -0.4 
United States 1.3 -0.4 4.5 -0.1 -3.2 -0.3 
Portugal -0.4 0.0 1.3 0.1 -1.7 -0.1 
Germany 7.2 0.0 3.8 0.0 3.4 0.0 
France 9.7 0.8 6.1 0.8 3.6 0.0 
Norway 2.7 1.8 1.0 1.8 1.6 0.0 
Spain 14.7 0.8 10.8 0.6 3.9 0.1 
Japan 2.3 -0.1 1.2 -0.3 1.1 0.2 
Australia 6.4 0.8 5.8 0.4 0.7 0.4 
Sweden 5.7 4.3 1.0 3.3 4.7 1.0 
Switzerland 3.6 1.7 0.5 0.5 3.1 1.2 
Canada 5.1 1.6 5.9 0.3 -0.8 1.3 
Italy 7.3 0.0 2.9 -1.4 4.4 1.4 
Belgium 7.9 2.3 7.8 0.7 0.1 1.6 
Finland 11.7 2.4 2.6 0.5 9.0 1.9 
     
  
linear 
correlation 0.23 -0.01 0.58 *** 
 
 
 
Notes 
An x+ period denotes a five-year period starting in year x. The changes in the unemployment rates are those 
observed over the corresponding periods. The changes in the effects of trade-regulation interactions are obtained 
from the estimating equation (12) (Table 2, column 4). Countries are ranked in ascending order of the changes in 
the interaction effect over the second half of the total period (last column). *** denotes significance at 1% level. 
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Figure 1: Average variables across countries 
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Figure 1b 
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Figure 2 
Linear correlation coefficient between the unemployment rate 
 and labour market institutions, per decade 
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Note 
The correlation coefficients are computed from yearly panel data. Very similar patterns are obtained when the correlations are 
calculated in a country cross-section using 10-year averages.  
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Figure 3: Labour market equilibrium 
Figure 3a 
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Figure 3b: Shifts due to an increase in the user cost of capital 
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Figure 4 
Regulation view in a two-sector model 
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Figure 5 
Trade between two countries having identical relative factor endowment 
u
n
em
pl
o
ym
en
t r
at
e
Low Regulation
A*
BD locus in the closed 
economy and in the 
integrated equilibrium
High Regulation
A
RR
RR*
p p*
u W
p T
BD
BD*
C
C*
 
user cost of capital or relative price of the capital intensive good, p  
 36 
Figure 6 
Comparison between Canada and Germany 
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Note. In order to facilitate the visual representation, values of the LMRTRADE  variables in this figure have 
been multiplied by 6. 
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Figure 7 
 
Estimated unemployment rate and trade-regulation effects 
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___   actual unemployment rate                               ___   estimated unemployment rate (Table 2, column 4) 
- - -   estimated unemployment rate minus trade-regulation interaction variables (Table 2, column 4)  
 
